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Abstract
We apply duration (survival) models with exponential and exponential
piecewise-constant hazard functions to a panel of 273 banks to study the de-
terminants of bank failure over the 1994-1998 period in Brazil. The models
deal empirically with left censoring in the data. We control for macroeconomic
conditions and contagion e⁄ects, as well as bank-speci￿c factors. Our results
indicate that foreign banks have distinct empirical survival functions relative
to other banks. For Brazil, macroeconomic and bank-level covariates explain
the likelihood and timing of bank failure. Our indicator of system-wide ￿-
nancial fragility (IFF) suggests that the banking industry faced increased
fragility after November 1995. We ￿nd (some) evidence that the Program of
Incentives for the Restructuring and Strengthening of the National Financial
System (Proer) was able to distinguish solvent from insolvent banks.
Keywords: Duration Analysis; Exponential Hazard; Bank Failures; Brazil.
JEL Classi￿cation Codes: C41 and G21.
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31 Introduction
From the beginning of the Real Plan in July 1994 until December 1998, 83 banks
￿commercial banks, universal banks and savings and loans associations ￿su⁄ered
some type of intervention, including from the adoption of special regimes by the
Central Bank of Brazil (BC) to any type of stockholder restructuring (mergers, in-
corporations, cancellations, changes of social object and split-ups) or privatizations.
It is worth mentioning that 59 banks ￿failed￿during the period, which represents
around 22% of the sample of all banks alive.
That ￿mortality￿pattern can be studied using duration analysis, which models
a Markov process with two states - ￿alive and dead.￿ These models are able to
explain and predict how the conditional probability of failure evolves over time,
which covariates a⁄ect it and when the potential failure occurs.
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of bank failure and bank unsound-
ness in Brazil over the 1994-1998 period. We apply duration (survival) analysis to
a panel of ￿time-to-event￿data, which allows disentangling bank - speci￿c factors
from others that lead to bank weakness. Since banking crises can be costly1 it seems
crucial that the ￿nancial system regulator collects information about the sources of
banking fragility to institute remedial action at troubled banks.
We also develop an indicator of system-wide ￿nancial fragility (IFF)2, which
is useful for ￿nancial surveillance. The estimated models enable us to estimate
the mean survival time of each bank in each month of the 1994-1998 period. It
also provides evidence that the Program of Incentives for the Restructuring and
Strengthening of the National Financial System (Proer) was able to distinguish
solvent from insolvent banks and avoid contagion.
The main methodological contributions of the paper are: i) dealing with left cen-
1A report by the World Bank (1999) mentions an IMF study that calculates the average cost
of a banking crisis in terms of a GDP loss as 14.6% (over a trend) per crisis. See also Bernanke
and Gertler (1990).
2An economy exhibits ￿nancial fragility if it possesses a propagation mechanism that allows
even small exogenous shocks to generate crises with relevant e⁄ects on the ￿nancial structure and
on the real activity of the economy.
4soring in the data; ii) incorporating time-varying covariates; and iii) controlling for
bank-speci￿c covariates, macroeconomic conditions, and potential contagion e⁄ects.
Our results indicate that: i) macroeconomic conditions contribute to explain
bank failures and improve in and out-of-sample accuracy of the models; ii) foreign
banks have a di⁄erent survival function and should be analyzed disjointly; iii) there
is no relevant bank-level liquidity indicator; iv) panel data information should be
used in these studies; and v) there is evidence that Proer avoided deposit runs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on and
discussion of the main issues in this literature. Section 3 brie￿ y describes the Brazil-
ian Banking system over the 1994-1998 period. Section 4 presents the data and the
expected e⁄ects of the covariates on bank fragility. Section 5 develops the method-
ology. Section 6 discusses the results. Some illustrations of models use are presented
in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Background
The literature that uses duration models to explain and predict bank failures for
the US Banking system includes Lane, Looney and Wansley (1986) who use a non-
parametric proportional hazard model introduced by Cox (1972) and non-time vary-
ing bank-speci￿c covariates for banks that failed between January 1978 and June
1984. DeYoung (2000) employs a split-population duration model with log-logistic
hazard function and time-varying bank-level covariates as well as regulatory and
economic environment variables to examine the ￿nancial performance of commer-
cial banks chartered between 1980 and 1985. Wheellock and Wilson (2000) model
failures and acquisitions using a competing-risk hazard model framework. They
utilize the Cox model with time-varying bank level covariates over the 1984-1993
period.
For the Argentinean Banking system, Dab￿s and Escudero (2000) use the Cox
model with non-time varying bank-speci￿c covariates (from November 1994). Berco⁄
5et al. (2002) employ a lognormal hazard function and time-varying macroeconomic
covariates and (non-time-varying) bank-speci￿c covariates over the 1993-1996 pe-
riod. For the Mexican Banking system GonzÆlez-Hemossillo et al. (1997) estimate a
split-population survival model with a log-logistic hazard function and bank-speci￿c,
macroeconomic and contagion variables from 1991 to 1995. Only the macroeconomic
variables are time-varying.3 For the Brazilian Banking system Rocha (1999) and
Janot (2001) employ the Cox model and non-time-varying covariates. The former
considers banks that failed between July 1994 and December 1995 and the latter,
between 1995 and 1996 (covariates from December 1994).
Usually, when duration models are used to study bank failure (for example Lane
et al., 1986; GonzÆlez-Hermosillo, 1999) the initial time period of the analysis does
not coincide with the true period in which banks are born. This practice results in
left censoring of the data, which is not taken into account during the statistical esti-
mation procedure. In this article we propose a hazard function that overcomes this
left censoring problem, which is the exponential function, a "memoryless" hazard.
GonzÆlez-Hermosillo (1999) discusses the ￿life cycle of bank failures￿and the
importance of capturing the ￿whole cycle￿ . In order to accomplish this task the
author suggests employing time-varying covariates. We adopt this approach in our
analysis.
The simultaneous use of bank-level indicators and macroeconomic variables proves
to be very important. The macroeconomic approach of bank failure cannot indepen-
dently explain why some banks survive macroeconomic shocks and others fail. On
the other hand, the bank-level approach ceases to be e¢ cient if one does not account
for varying economic conditions. In this sense, we include both types of variables
in our models. Furthermore, we follow Berco⁄ et al. (2000), GonzÆlez-Hermosillo
(1999), GonzÆlez-Hermossilo et al. (1997) and D￿ Amato et al. (1997) when choosing
contagion proxies.
3It is not clear if the bank-speci￿c covariates are time-varying as well.
63 The Brazilian Banking System and Proer
Before the implementation of the Real Plan in July 1994 the Brazilian banking
system was based on high-in￿ ation rate funds transfers from the depositors to the
banks. Despite accounting for a small portion of the banks￿liabilities, the demand
deposits bore a strong negative ex-post real interest rate. If the ￿Ponzi-game condi-
tion￿applies, which means here that the bank￿ s deposits growth rate is higher than
the interest rate paid for the bank￿ s liabilities, then the system functions well and
is likely over-dimensioned.
After the Real Plan, in￿ ationary transfers to the banking system decreased by
almost R$ 9 billion until 19964 (around USD 4.1 billion). It is possible that in
some moment after the Plan the bank￿ s deposits growth rate was lower than the
interest rate paid by the banks to the depositors. Under this situation the banks
have basically two choices: make a fund transfer from the borrowers or sell their
stock of net assets. If the economy su⁄ers a shock, as during the Mexican crisis
in December 1994, and the transfers reach very high levels, the system can face a
banking crisis.
During this period, the loss of ￿ oating revenue was compensated by a rise in
loan revenues5, which generated a ￿lending boom￿ . There is evidence that both in
industrialized and Latin American countries such booms are sometimes followed by
banking crises: it becomes more di¢ cult to disentangle good from bad borrowers.
This is reinforced by the evolution of the credit default rate after the Real Plan:
to consumers it increased to 16.67% of the total credit operations from July to
November 1995 from 4.38% in the second semester of 1994.
Therefore, after the Plano Real, the Central Bank of Brazil had to regulate
an over-dimensioned banking system. As part of the main reforms were the Basle
Capital Agreement in 1994, and the inclusion of many state-owned banks such as
4See Cysne (1997).
5In such a situation, it seems that the banks are not willing to reduce costs because any bank
that delays the adjustment can increase its market share.
7Banespa and Banerj in the Special Regime of Temporary Administration (Raet). In
spite of several preventive measures, a banking crisis seemed to have settled in after
the intervention of Banco Econ￿mico in August 1995.
To avoid the high costs of a system-wide banking crisis, the Central Bank
implemented the Program of Incentives for the Restructuring and Strengthening
of the National Financial System (Proer) in November 1995. The credit lines
and the subsidized tax treatment granted under Proer were aimed at promoting
bank mergers and incorporations by other institutions. Seven banks were either
merged, incorporated or had their shareholder control transferred while making use
of Proer resources. Under the Proer, the Central Bank restructured 4 private banks
(Econ￿mico, Bamerindus, Nacional and Banorte) using the "good bank/ bad bank"
failure resolution method and it granted credit lines to the acquirer banks, as Table
I indicates.
Table I: Sale of Banks with Resources from Proer





Sale  of  part  of  assets  and
liabilities to:
19,108






Banorte Banco Bandeirantes e CEF
Bamerindus HSBC e CEF
Banks  not  under
Intervention







Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
1/ Historical values.
4 Data
Our initial sample consists of all 273 banks that were operating in July 1994 or
opened from July 1994 through December 1998 (24 banks). The covariates are
time-varying from 1994 to 1998. The sample does not include Banco Morgan Stan-
ley Dean Witter, Banco HolandŒs Unido, Banco Paraiban, Banco Banerj and Banco
8Pottencial, for which complete data was not available. The bank-level series were
discontinued in 1999. The sample period is homogeneous in terms of regulation,
the technical production possibilities of the banking industry, and economic envi-
ronment.
In this paper, we de￿ne a bank survival spell as the length of time that a bank
stays solvent. As the events of bank unsoundness and legal bankruptcy do not nec-
essarily occur at the same time, we consider as insolvent banks that have undergone
Special Regimes - which include Raet, intervention and out-of-court liquidation -
have been canceled, or have received ￿nancial support from the Central Bank of
Brazil during the sample period.
We also consider banks that are cancelled due to change of business goals, incor-
porations, transfers of stockholder controls, and privatizations to have a censored
lifetime, with censor date equal to the date of the event. Incorporated banks are
treated like merged banks since it is not possible to split them into separated banks.
Therefore, both the incorporated banks and the incorporating banks have a censored
duration. Banks that su⁄er transfers of stockholder control operate separately and
only the acquired bank has a censored lifetime.
Description of Events






Cancellation due to change





                  Obs: 0 = censoring e 1 = failure.
Table II summarizes the breakdown of failure events in our sample.








   Source: PCIF 400 from Sisbacen.
   Note: The first event that occurred since July 1994.
We assume that bank strati￿cation follows the equity capital ownership
criteria: federal and state-owned banks, private national banks, foreign banks and
private national banks with foreign capital, named types 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
Table III describes the number of failures and observed duration by type of bank.





failures Observed duration (in months)
2/
Minimum Mean Maximum
1- State-owned 30 9 5 43.8 53
2- Private National
1/ 163 44 2 41.2 53
3- Foreign-owned 47 1 7 46.7 53
4- Priv. Nat. w/Foreign 31 5 21 49.0 53
Total 271 59
1/ The Bancos Hércules and Garavelo were excluded.
2/ The duration is calculated over the 1994-1998 period.
Our hypothesis here is that bank fragility is determined by bank-speci￿c factors,
macroeconomic conditions, and contagion e⁄ects. The covariates in Appendix A.1
control for those aspects. The Appendix A.1 also shows the expected e⁄ect of the
variables (signs in the statistical models) on the estimated survival times. Our data
source is the Central Bank of Brazil.
We select and test 29 out of 68 bank-level indicators from the ￿System of In-
stitutions under Attendance and Control of the Central Bank of Brazil￿ , hereafter
called INDCON system, collected every semester. The INDCON system classi￿es
10the indicators into ￿ve groups representing: capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A),
pro￿tability (R), e¢ ciency (E), and liquidity adequacy (L).6
We include several forward and backward-looking macroeconomic variables, avail-
able either per month or semester. Besides those variables described in the Appendix
A.1 we tested the Selic nominal rate, the General Price Index-Market (IGP-M) and
the spread over Treasury for the C-BOND. All macroeconomic covariates were tested
under several lags and frequencies. The typical included variable varies monthly and
is lagged for three-months. The variables leaded by 0, 2 and 6 remain constant over
each six-month interval. For example, the ones followed by 0 are the variables in
June and in December of each year from 1994 to 1998; the ones followed by 2 have a
two-month lag and by 6 a six-months lag. To have some sense of the initial lags, we
use an event study methodology, which consists in examining the variable in level
and its mean until twelve months prior to the failure event and comparing it to the
variable mean outside the twelve-month window.
We choose contagion variables that a⁄ect the banking system as a whole and
have been related to herding behavior and deposits run. Economies of scale, port-
folio diversi￿cation, and bank runs a la Diamong-Dybvig (1983) are addressed by
speci￿c covariates (see Appendix A.1). Economies of scale and portfolio diversi￿-
cation e⁄ects are represented by the variable ativoreal, which represents the asset
value in the current month. For the variables ativorealin￿cio, ativorealmeio and ati-
voreal￿m we make the asset value constant over the six-month interval, but employ
the values at the beginning, middle and end of the half-year period, respectively.
Bank runs are addressed by the demand deposits growth rate. To avoid endo-
geneity problems, we instrument the variable by using the demand deposits growth
rate lagged three months (vardvlag3). The variable vardvmean is the average of the
demand deposits growth rate over the six-month interval.7
6The INDCON system follows the US ￿Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (UFIRS)￿
also called the ￿CAMEL rating system￿ . Under the CAMEL rating system each ￿nancial institu-
tion is assigned a composite rating based on an evaluation of components that address the capital
adequacy, the assets quality, the capability of management, the quality and level of earnings,
liquidity, and the sensitivity to market risk.
7The results including demand deposits growth rate are not reported.
11Concerned about moral hazard problems, we assess whether the establishment of
a formal scheme of insurance deposit in Brazil has changed the probability of bank
failure. The dummy variable fgc (1 after December 1995 and 0 otherwise) was not
statistically signi￿cant in any statistical estimation and was excluded.
5 Methodology
Duration models are usually applied to censored data, and therefore one should de-
rive a likelihood function for such data. For a random draw i from the population, let
ti denote the time for which individual i is observed and let ti￿ denote the duration.
If i dies with ti < ti￿, there is no right censoring and estimation employs traditional
conditional maximum likelihood (CLE). In order to account for right censoring, we
assume that the observed duration ti is obtained as ti = min(ti￿;bi), where bi is the
censoring time for individual i. The probability that ti is censored is:
P(t
￿
i > bi j xi) = 1 ￿ F(bi j xi;￿)
where F(:) is the conditional cdf of ti￿ given xi - the vector of observed covariates -
and ￿ - the vector of unknown parameters.
Let di denote a binary failure indicator that equals one if a bank fails and zero
otherwise and f(.) the probability density function. The conditional likelihood





























are the hazard and the survival functions.








fdi log￿(ti j xi;￿) ￿ ￿(ti j xi;￿)g (2)
For the grouped data, we divide the time line into J+1 intervals (0, ￿1], (￿1,
￿2],..., (￿J￿1; ￿J], (￿J, 1). Let cj be a binary censorship indicator, which is equals
to one if the duration is censored in interval j, and zero otherwise, and yj be a binary
indicator equal to one if the duration ends in the j-th interval and zero otherwise.
Note that cj = 1 implies cj+1 = 1 and cJ+1 ￿ 1. Also, yj = 1 implies yJ+1 = 1. If
cj = 1, we adopt by convention that yj ￿ 1.
Following Wooldridge (2002), only two combinations of yj, yj￿1 and cj yield
probabilities that are not identically equal to zero or one, which are:










￿ 1 ￿ ￿j(x;￿)
and
P(yj = 0 j yj￿1 = 0;x;cj = 0) = ￿j(x;￿)







[1 ￿ ￿j(xi;￿)] (3)







If the duration is censored in interval ji, the likelihood is only the ￿rst term on
the right hand side of equation (3).
In the case of time-varying covariates that are constant within each time interval,







[1 ￿ ￿ji(xi;ji;￿)] (3￿ )
In the paper, we implement CLE (Conditional Likelihood Estimation) using
exponential and piecewise-constant exponential (PCE) hazard functions in eq. (3￿ ).
6 Results
We ￿rst present (Figure 1) baseline estimations of the unconditional survival func-
tions (Kaplan-Meier estimator) for the true spells of the banks (considering the
e⁄ective date they started business) and for spells beginning in July 1994 (left cen-
sored data).
The two curves have very distinct behavior, with the one on the left a lot steeper
than the one on the right (left censored data). This is an indication that ignoring
the left censoring may distort the survival function estimations.
In order to investigate the issue of continuous vis-a-vis discrete data, the survival
functions were also estimated using daily instead of monthly data. They behave very
similarly, indicating that they do not depend on the level of aggregation.
We performed non-parametric rank tests (of survival time) for the equality of
survival functions among the four types of banks considered. Visual inspection of
the survival functions indicated that foreign banks had a distinct behavior. We use
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Figure 1: Empirical Survival Functions - Monthly data
The log-rank test is more appropriate under the assumption that the hazard
functions are proportional among groups, if they are not the same. The Fleming
- Harrington is a generalization of the ￿rst one but we can give di⁄erent weights
to the events, depending on the point in time they happen. Because one of the
applications of our paper is to verify the presence of contagion, we give higher
weights to the events that occur more towards the beginning of the analyzed period,
when the Proer was implemented. The Peto-Peto-Prentice test is appropriate when
we assume that the hazard functions are a⁄ected by di⁄erences in the censoring
structure among the banks. All three tests reject the null hypothesis that all four
types of banks have the same survival function. However, the null cannot be rejected
when comparing only state-owned (type 1), private national (type 2) and private
national with foreign capital (type 3) banks, as you can see in Appendix A.2 to
the log-rank test. We obtain similar results when considering only the banks which
collect demand deposits.
Table IV shows average survival times by type of bank, using data with the
actual birth dates of the banks and the left censored data (starting in July 1994).
The restricted mean is the area below the KM survival function from July 1994 to
15December 1998. The extended mean is obtained by taking the KM survival function
to zero using an exponential curve, and then computing the total area under the
curve.
Table IV: Survival Time –  Restricted and Extended Means (in months)










State-owned 30 967.18 44.20(*) 967.18 146.53
Private National 165 859.32 44.93(*) 859.32 152.02
Foreign-owned 47 1601.86(*) 52.95(*) 59946.92 1935.04
Priv. Nat. w/Foreign 31 708.08(*) 50.56(*) 2668.89 288.91
total 273 1003.83 46.86(*) 1003.83 196.69
(*) The greatest time observed in our analysis is censored, indicating that the average is underestimated.
The previous results corroborate the idea that foreign-owned banks have a dis-
tinct survival behavior, and therefore should not be analyzed together with the other
type of banks. Also, the issue of left censored data should not be ignored. If we
consider the actual birth date, the state-owned banks seem to have a higher survival
time than the private national ones, and this result disappears if we censor our data
in July 1994.
In the Appendix A.2 we can see several microeconomics variables the have dif-
ferent means (t-statistic) among survivors and failed banks. The upper side of the
Table "Descriptive Statistics" shows the variables employed in the models and the
lower side those rejected.
6.1 Conditional Models
Because we are concerned with the colinearity problem that might be present in
these kinds of models, we start our model selection process by performing a factorial
analysis on the data in order to keep the variables strongly associated with the main
factors and achieve an initial reduction in the number of bank-level covariates.8 As
you can see in Appendix A.2, the factorial analysis retains 11 factors. The proportion
of the total variance explained by the factors is low. Therefore, we further use
8The results for the factorial analysis are available from the authors upon request.
16the explanatory and forecasting accuracy of the variables as a selection criterion.
All estimates use a robust var-cov matrix based on e¢ cient-score residuals. The
observations are likely non-independent, given that we are dealing with covariates
that vary in time.
We estimate four model speci￿cations ￿A, B, C and D. Model A is an exponential
model with constant hazard baseline function. It includes bank-level indicators
(micro) and macroeconomic variables (IPI and Selic9). Model B is a piecewise-
exponential model (with bank-level variabels), in which the hazard baseline functions
vary in each interval considered (0,6], (6,12], (12,18], (18,24], (24,30], (30,36], (36,42],
(42,48], (48,53].10 Model C is an exponential model that di⁄ers from model A in the
macroeconomic and contagion variables included: Mres ￿ratio of total imports to
international reserves (liquidity concept), and Vacre ￿monthly percentage change of
loans.11 Finally, in model D we include only microeconomic variables for comparison
with the previous literature.
The microeconomic variables which are signi￿cant in all estimated models are: 1)
recovery of the administrative expenses through service￿ s income (r205), an indicator
of e¢ ciency that has a negative sign decreasing the conditional probability of failure;
2) ratio of atypical assets to total assets (a103), which indicates fraud risk and it
impacts positively the probability of failure; 3) operational margin (monthly average
in a semester) (r305), with a positive sign, meaning that a higher spread increases
the chances of failure; 4) leverage ratio (c204) and 5) ratio of non-performing loans
to total loan (a201) both are indicators of credit risk and have a positive sign; 6)
loan reserve coverage which reduces the probability of failure and works as a bu⁄er
to absorb shocks; 7) ratio of other liabilities to liabilities (c107) that is a measure of
a possible deterioration of the bank situation and has a positive impact on failure.
The variable general solvency (l104) is not signi￿cant in any of the regressions, a
result that is not surprising, given that this variable only shows a mismatch between
9See the Appendix A.1 for a description of the variables and expected e⁄ects.
10The intervals are measured in months starting in July 1994 and ending in December 1998. The
estimates are robust to the length of the intervals.
11See the Appendix A.1 for a description of the variables and expected e⁄ects.
17assets and liabilities. None of the liquidity variables are signi￿cant either, which also
was not surprising given that the liquidity indicators from the INDCON system do
not seem to measure liquidity well. The asset variable, which would be a measure
of economies of scale and portfolio diversi￿cation, is not signi￿cant. In addition, we
include a variable for the bank age at the beginning of the estimation period and
it is not signi￿cant in any model, evidencing that the exponential speci￿cation is
actually reasonable.
Table V shows the estimates for models A and D. We report the hazard ratio
coe¢ cients which measure the proportional e⁄ect in the hazard function from ab-
solute changes in the covariates. The variables IPI (industrial production indicator)
and Selic rate12 are lagged for 6 months in model A. They both have positive signs,
increasing the probability of a bank failure. A high interest rate increases the vul-
nerability of banks to shocks, while an increase in IPI could lead to lending booms,
associated with economic and credit growth, and also to higher vulnerability. The
sign and magnitude of the coe¢ cients in model D are similar to the other estimated
models, but its predictive power is lower as will be shown later. The main di⁄erence
with the previous models is that the variable ￿evolution of typical assets operations￿
is only signi￿cant at 10%. It could be indicating lending booms and therefore would
be associated with production levels and interest rate. However, it has a negative
impact on the conditional probability of bank failure13; 14:
12The Special System of Custody and Settlement of Federal Securities overnight rate (Selic),
expressed in annual terms, is the average rate weighted by the volume of one-day operations backed
by federal government securities, carried out at Selic system through repurchase agreements.
13Our results are compatible with Rocha (1999). Using a non-time varying dataset, she ￿nds
that ￿leverage ratio￿ , ￿ratio of non-performing loans to total loans￿ , ￿operational margin￿ , and
￿ratio of the total funding to typical assets￿are signi￿cant. In our model speci￿cation D, including
only banks that collect demand deposits, all but ￿ratio of the total funding to typical assets￿are
signi￿cant as well. However, the results of Janot (2001) are substantially di⁄erent, given that he
￿nds the ￿ratio of liquid assets to typical assets￿ , the ￿ratio of loans funded by the foreign market
to liabilities￿ , and the ￿ratio of administrative cost to adjusted total assets￿as signi￿cant.
14Even though the variables ￿evolution of typical assets operations (e202)￿ , ￿ratio of administra-
tive cost to average assets (r409)￿and ￿return on adjusted total assets (r206)￿are not signi￿cant,
we keep them for comparison with other studies, but our results are not a⁄ected by their exclusion.
18Table V: Summary of Results for Models A (exponential model, bank-level and
macroeconomic variables) and D (exponential model and bank-level variables)










IPI-lag6** 1.0375 0.0172 0.027 - - -
Selic-lag6** 1.0014 0.0006 0.024 - - -
Recovery Adm. Expenses** 0.9899 0.0045 0.025 0.9904 0.0038 0.013
Atypical assets/ total assets *** 1.0334 0.0078 0.000 1.0349 0.0080 0.000
Operational Margin*** 1.0005 0.0001 0.000 1.0005 0.0001 0.000
Leverage ratio*** 1.0002 0.0001 0.000 1.0002 0.0001 0.000
Non-performing/ total loans *** 1.0318 0.0053 0.000 1.0333 0.0051 0.000
Evol. typical assets operat. *
1/ 0.9999 0.0001 0.243 0.9999 0.0001 0.086
Loan reserve coverage*** 0.9677 0.0085 0.000 0.9651 0.0087 0.000
Adm. Cost/ average assets 1.0752 0.0878 0.374 1.0639 0.0966 0.495
Other liabilities/ liabilities.*** 1.0003 0.0001 0.000 1.0003 0.0001 0.000
Return on adjusted total assets 0.9798 0.0178 0.262 0.9844 0.0205 0.453
Real assets 1.0000 0.0000 0.185 1.0000 0.0000 0.205
    Note: ***, ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
      1/Significant at 10% only for Model D.
The results for models B (PCE model with bank-level variabels) and C (expo-
nential model, contagion, macro and bank-level variables) are in Appendix A.2, and
there are some interesting ￿ndings. The coe¢ cients of the microeconomic variables
in the piecewise-exponential model B have signs and magnitudes that are similar
to the other models. The only time interval that has a signi￿cant hazard baseline
function at 10% is the one from July 1996 to December 1996, and the conditional
probability of failure is smaller than in any other period. An interesting result in
Model C is that the variable " import/ international reserve ratio" increases the
probability of failure in the banking system.
We estimate other parameterizations of the baseline hazard function for models
A, C and D: Weibull, Log-logistic, Lognormal, Gompertz, and generalized Gamma15
(Appendix A.2). We also estimate the non-parametric Cox model using only bank-
level variables. Based on the AIC and BIC, the exponential model is in general better
speci￿ed, and whenever one of these criteria pointed to some other speci￿cation, the
predictive capability of the exponential model was always better.
Figure 2 shows the estimated survival functions to model A (exponential model,
including micro and macro variables) for the banks that fail and for the ones that do
not fail. Because we have a survival function for each bank, we calculate the average
probability of survival for each time period (1, 2,..., T), for each group (failed and
non-failed). We notice that the survival dynamics is substantially di⁄erent for the
15There is no equivalence to model B (piecewise-exponential) for these other parameterizations.
19two groups. The survival function for the failed banks is always below the one for
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Figure 2: Estimated In-Sample Survival Functions
In order to verify the model￿ s goodness of ￿t, we plot the predicted Cox-snell
residuals (Newmann, 1997). If the model represents a good ￿t, the residuals should
have approximately an exponential distribution with unit parameter. We treat the
residuals as a time variable and plot them against the accumulated empirical hazard
distribution. A good ￿t would result in a straight line with slope equal to one. Figure
3 presents these plots for models A and D.16 All exponential and PCE models seem
to be well adjusted. The right tail of the distribution presents higher dispersion
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16The plots of residuals for the other models are available from the authors upon request.
20Figure 3: Cox-snell residuals
Figure 4 shows Martingale residuals versus A201 covariate (ratio of non - per-
forming loans to total loans) to Model A. Plots of those residuals are useful in
assessing whether the functional form of the covariate is adequate. As we can see,
as the smooth curve is linear around zero, no transformation is necessary. The same
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Figure 4: Martingale residuals - Model A
6.2 Forecasting Bank Failure
6.2.1 In-Sample Forecasting
Most studies about bank fragility make in-sample forecasts for certain time intervals.
Actually, since most studies assume ￿xed covariates, the forecasted survival function
depends directly on the chosen hazard baseline function, which varies in time. The
forecast for intervals is used when one does not have new information available in
each period to distinguish the individuals (banks), but this does not happen when
panel data is used.
Using the estimated models to classify banks as failed and non-failed, for each
time horizon, in and out of sample, is not trivial. The estimated survival probabilities
should be compared to some critical (cuto⁄) value. Typically, the proportion of
banks that fail and do not fail in the sample is used to determine this cuto⁄.17 This
17See for example Dab￿s and Escudero (2000) and Lane et al. (1986).
21approach has some drawbacks when the covariates vary in time or even when the
data is censored (banks leave or enter the sample during the period), depending on
how the failures are distributed in time. If we do not adjust the sample for the
censored banks, we would overestimate the proportion of failures. In this sense, the
model would say less often that a bank fails, diminishing the probability of type II
error and increasing the type I error.
Because of the use of panel data, we are able to forecast the probability of bank
failure in each month. We calculate the proportion of failures and non-failures,
month by month, correcting for censoring which also includes the banks that are born
in the period. The proportion of banks that fail in the ￿rst period is given by the ratio
of number of failures in the ￿rst period to the sum of failures and censored banks after
the ￿rst period. The same reasoning is applied to the subsequent periods. However,
these proportions are the ones used for the Kaplan-Meier estimates. Therefore,
our comparisons are between the estimated survival function and the proportion of
failures corrected month by month.
The null ￿hypothesis￿in our analysis is a bank failure, and we are interested in
type I error (the model does not predict a bank failure when it actually happens),
but also in type II error (the model predicts a failure when it does not happen).
From the regulator point of view, type I errors should be given a higher weight in
his objective function because it involves higher costs to resolve. However, type II
errors also imply in costs, given that the regulator has scarce resources and has to
prioritize a group of banks to supervise.
Characterizing a prediction as type II error depends on the period and time
horizon of interest. Some type II errors represent banks that fail at sometime in
the near future, and therefore could be considered a model success. The in-sample
forecasts for all model speci￿cations are presented in Table VI.
The ￿rst cell in Table VI indicates that model A forecasts correctly the month in
which the failure occurs 73% of the time, during the considered period. Considering
the banks that actually fail during the period, but taking only the ones for which the
22relationship between the events forecasted as a failure and the events not forecasted
as failure is above the percentage cuto⁄ for type II error, the type I error decreases
to 3%. In this case, the model forecasts correctly 97% of the time in a 53-month
time horizon.18
Table VI: In-Sample Forecasts from 07/1994 to 12/1998
Forecast Errors Model A Model B Model C Model D
Type I Error 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.38
Type I Error in 53 Months 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Type II Error 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.26
Type II Error for d=1 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.44
Note: d=1 indicate the banks that fail at sometime of the considered period, but not in the specific month.
Since type II errors could be of interest (prediction of a failure when it dos not
happen), this percentage, for banks that fail in the period, but not in a speci￿c
month, is higher (0.54 instead of 0.30) than for the banks that do not fail, i.e., the
model predicts correctly that the banks which eventually fail had problems before
hand. This makes it possible for the regulator to act ex-ante, reducing the costs of
resolving a bank failure, including the costs of rediscount lending from the Central
Bank.
Model D (only includes microeconomic variables) is the one with the worst fore-
casting power, given that its type I error is greater than any other model￿ s. On
the other hand, model D has the lowest probability of type II error, but it cannot
distinguish very well the failed from the non-failed banks, as the di⁄erence between
the two kinds of type II error is the smallest.
6.2.2 Out-of-Sample Forecasting
It would be ideal to use the estimated models for July 1994 to December 1998 to
predict the subsequent years. However, the INDCON system was interrupted after
18For the banks that do not fail, using the same cuto⁄ value and the same methodology, the
percentage of type II error (around 0.30) is similar to the one obtained for the considered period.
231999, making it impossible to perform forecasts after this year. We decide to re-
estimate the models using the July 1994 to December 1997 data and simulate the
forecast for January to December of 1998.
The ￿rst issue to be discussed here is the cuto⁄value for the survival probability.
Some authors (see Whalen, 1991; and Dab￿s and Escudero, 2000) adopt the same
cuto⁄ used for the in-sample forecast, or they calculate another cuto⁄ taking into
account only the banks that fail during the time period outside the sample. We make
use of the Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimates for the period until 1997 and we construct
new probabilities taking into account only the failures that happen in 1998.19
Table VII: Out-of-Sample Forecasts from 01/1998 to 12/1998
Forecast Errors Model A Model B Model C Model D
Type I Error in the month 0.33 0.40 0.40 0.33
Type I Error in 12 Months 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.33
Type II Error 0.30 0.34 0.28 0.32
Type II Error for d=1 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.43
Note: d=1 indicate the banks that fail at sometime of the considered period, but not in the specific month.
Table VII presents the out-of-sample forecasts. Models A and D forecast cor-
rectly the month of a failure in 67% of the cases. Models A and B make the best
forecast if we consider a one year period, 83% of the cases. Note that a one-year
period forecast represents an upper bound for the out-of-sample forecast error. The
predictions for a two-year period should be better and it would improve for longer
periods of time.
6.3 Comparison of Bank Failure Models
In order to compare our results with previous duration models for bank failure in
Brazil, we estimate a model including only microeconomic variables and cross-section
data from July 1994. Table VIII shows the results. There are only four signi￿cant
19The results are only slightly di⁄erent than if we use the KM for the period until 1998 or if we
consider the survival function for period until 1997.
24variables in this model, and all except ￿evolution of typical assets operations￿are
also signi￿cant in our panel data models with micro, macro and contagion variables.
The forecast accuracy of this model is a lot worse that of our models. For the in-
sample forecast, the type I error for a 53-month period is 0.21, predicting a failure
in 79% of the cases, while it is 0.03 for our model A, predicting a failure in 97% of
the cases. The type II error is 0.42 and it is 0.30 for our model A.






Recovery Adm. Expenses 0.9922 0.0075 0.300
Atypical assets/ total assets*** 1.0467 0.0130 0.000
Operational Margin 1.0102 0.0149 0.491
Leverage ratio* 1.0001 0.0001 0.068
Non-performing/ total loans 1.0191 0.0186 0.299
Evol. typical assets operations* 1.0002 0.0001 0.091
Loan reserve coverage 0.9978 0.0247 0.928
Adm. Cost/ average assets 1.1610 0.1166 0.137
Other liabilities/ tot liabilities*** 0.9694 0.0114 0.008
Return on adjusted tot assets 0.8524 0.0966 0.159
Final real assets 1.0000 1.24E-10 0.582
Note: ***, ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
7 Applications
7.1 Mean and Median Survival Time
The duration models developed in this paper can be applied to obtain the estimated
(in-sample) time of bank failures. Using each conditional model we estimate the
mean and median survival times of individual banks for each month of the 1994-
1998 period. The median survival time is de￿ned as the time, t, for which ^ S(t) =





where ^ S(t) is the estimated (in-sample) survival function.
25Figure 5 reports the mean and median survival times according to Model A by
bank category: 0 represents the banks that survived through December 1998 and 1
the banks that failed in some period until December 1998. There is a concentration
of short survival times for failed banks. As one would expect, the surviving banks
exhibit long survival time very often. A striking result is that the failed banks that
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Figure 5: Mean and Median Survival Times - Model A - by Category
Besides making bank-level surveillance of the banking system possible, the ex-
pected time to failure allows the regulator to oversee the survival time path and to
detect outliers so that it becomes possible to take remedial action. In addition the
estimated survival times are comparable among all banks, making any segmentation
useless.
7.2 Financial Fragility Index
The methodology proposed in this paper can be extended to provide an indicator of
system-wide ￿nancial fragility. We build a ￿nancial fragility index (IFF) based on
20A possible explanation is that when a bank is near to fail it tends to hidden information of its
account system.
26the estimated (in-sample) conditional probability of failure of each individual bank





where pit is the conditional probability of failure, ￿t￿indexes month, ￿i￿indexes
bank and ￿it is the ratio of each bank￿ s assets to the total assets of the banking
system.
Figure 6 displays the IFF based on Models A (micro and macro covariates) and
D (only micro covariates) estimations from July 1994 to December 1998. The IFF
follows a similar path for both models, except for the time interval between 35 and
40 months when it is declining for Model A and increasing for Model D. Model A
presents a local maximum around 35 months, time of Banco Bamerindus failure.
Both models indicate a high degree of banking fragility soon before the adoption of
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Figure 6: Financial Fragility Index
8 Contagion
In this section, we approach the question of the likelihood that banks failed during
the Brazilian banking crisis because of contagion in the banking system. Our case
27study is the Proer. There was a debate during the institution of Proer about whether
the Central Bank should grant subsidized loans to the banks after the December
1995 crisis. The prevalent argument was that the increased systemic risk would
make ex-ante solvent banks fail without that liquidity support.
In our case it is di¢ cult to analyze the e⁄ectiveness of Proer in avoiding conta-
gion, since a counterfactual (bank failure without Proer) does not exist. Because it
is a universal program (all banks can bene￿t from it) there is no control group to
perform an evaluation of the program. However, if we assume that contagion would
happen, we can verify if Proer was e¢ cient in stopping it21. Also, we would like to
look for evidence that contagion would actually take place without Proer.
We divide our sample of banks in three groups: banks that failed until November
1995 (before Proer) ￿group 1, banks that fail during Proer ￿group 2, and banks that
survived through December 1998 ￿group 0. We then compare ex-ante attributes
of the groups, testing for di⁄erences across groups in means and medians of: i)
the estimated probability of failure of banks; ii) the monthly real demand deposits
growth.
Testing if group 2 banks are on average as strong as survivors (in terms of
probability of failure) amounts to say that solvent banks could have failed during
Proer. In addition, if group 2 banks are at least as strong as group 1 banks, we would
say that there is evidence in favor of the null hypothesis that bank failures were a
continuation of the same process and that Proer may not have reduced systemic
risk.
Table IX indicates that banks that failed during Proer and survivor banks have
di⁄erent (mean and median) monthly real demand deposits growth, but banks that
failed before Proer and survivors have not. This is evidence that before Proer
depositors were not able to distinguish between solvent and insolvent banks and
that Proer was e⁄ective in avoiding bank runs.
21Here, we refer to contagion by asymmetric information as in De Bandt and Hartmann (2000).
28Table IX: Tests for Differences in Mean and Median:






Statistics t  and χ
2
0 e 1 0,5425 0,2215
0 e 2 1,8693* 13,8876***
1 e 2 -0,0803 0,0096
1/ Bartlett's test was applied to confirm if the two-sample data have equal variances.
                    If unequal the test was carried on using the Satterthwaite approximation.
The tests for di⁄erences in the conditional probability of failure are presented in
Table X. The mean and median probabilities of failure are signi￿cantly di⁄erent for
all three groups of banks. The survivors have the lowest probability of failure when
compared to any of the other groups. The banks that fail during the Proer seem to
be stronger than the ones that fail before, which could be an indication that solvent
banks break during the Proer.
Table X: Tests for Differences in Mean and Median
Monthly Conditional Probability of Failure –  Model A
1/ Bartlett's test was applied to confirm if the two-sample data have equal variances.





Statistics t e χ
2
0 e 1 -3,7069*** 64,1114***
0 e 2 -5,0346*** 29,2685***
1 e 2 2,2430 ** 39,9466***
Based on the demand deposits growth rate it seems that depositors could dis-
tinguish between solvent and insolvent banks during the Proer, and this may have
contributed to avoid bank runs and contagion. However, as we reject the hypothesis
of equality in the conditional probability of failure among groups, we need some
29caution in interpreting the results in terms of contagion.
9 Conclusion
Based on empirical duration models we estimate conditional probabilities of failure
for all Brazilian banks, except foreign-owned ones, that existed in July 1994 or were
born between this month and December 1998. We also aggregate all conditional
probabilities of failure in a single index (IFF) ￿Financial Fragility Index ￿that
gives a general measure of crisis risk.
Our analysis ￿nds that foreign banks have a very particular survival behavior,
and therefore should be studied separately. The bank-level covariates in our condi-
tional models were signi￿cantly related to the probability of failure, however, none
of the liquidity indicators were relevant.
This study has the following main contributions. First, it adds contagion and
macroeconomic variables to the traditional models based upon accounting data.
These macro variables are in fact signi￿cant in some models and contribute to in-
crease the predictive power of these duration models.
Second, it uses panel data. The introduction of time-varying variables increases
enormously the predictive power of the models relatively to similar speci￿ed cross-
section models. Some of our models are able to predict the exact month a failure
occurs 73% of the time (in-sample forecast). If we are only concerned about failure
and not the exact month, the model is correct 97% of the time.
Third, the study discusses the e⁄ectiveness of the program Proer in reducing
bank runs and contagion. Even though it is not possible to formally test the hy-
pothesis that Proer avoided contagion, we ￿nd indications that Proer was e¢ cient
in separating solvent from insolvent banks ex-ante, minimizing the failure of sound
banks.
Fourth, the problem of left censoring in duration models data was addressed.
The non-consideration of the actual date of birth of banks can bias and decrease the
30forecasting accuracy of the models.
One ￿nal contribution is the demonstration that bank-level indicators are not
necessarily poor predictors of bank failure. Our innovation is the use of a broader
dataset.
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34A Appendix
A.1 Description of the Variables
Bank-Level Indicators
Indicator What the Variables Measure Survival Time: Expected Sign
A101 - ratio of liquid assets to typical
assets
Liquidity risk _/+. High ratio may indicate that the
bank has difficulties to participate in
the  interbank  market.  On  the  other
hand, it may measure bank’ s ability
to deal with deposit withdrawals.
A102 - ratio of assets to adjusted total
assets
Fraud and market risks +
A103 - ratio of atypical assets to total
assets
Fraud Risk _
A106 - ratio of real state loans to total
loans
Market risk _.  Commercial real  state  loans tend
to  be  risky  because  they  typically
have long maturation periods.
A108 - ratio of foreign exchange
operations to typical asset operations
Market risk _. Negative if the ratio indicates high
concentration  of  foreign  exchange
operations.
A201 - ratio of non-performing loans to
total loans
Credit risk _
A202 - financial assets reserve coverage Credit risk +
A203 - loan reserve coverage Credit risk _/+  .  Growing  trend  may  indicate
deterioration  of  the  bank’ s  loans
quality.  High  level  of  reserves  may
represent a cushion to absorb shocks.





A302 - ratio of the non-interest-bearing
deposits to typical assets
Liquidity risk _
A303 - ratio of interest-bearing deposits
to total asset operations
Liquidity risk _/+. It depends on the deposit being
more or less volatile during crises.
C102 –  ratio of loans funded by the
domestic market to liabilities
Credit risk _/+. It depends on the business cycle.
C104 –  ratio of loans funded by the
foreign market to liabilities
It should be composed with it
above.
_  /+.  It  depends  on  the  business
cycle.
35Bank-Level Indicators (cont.)
Indicator What the Variables Measure Survival Time: Expected Sign
C107 - ratio of other liabilities to total
liabilities.
Credit risk _
C204 - leverage ratio Credit risk _
E202 - evolution of typical assets
operations
To verify lending booms _/+ . Negative if it indicates lending
booms.
L104 - solvency Solvency +
R102 - monthly average return on equity
in the semester
Solvency +
R201 - net margin Efficiency +
R205 - recovery of the administrative
expenses through service's income
Efficiency +
R206 –  return on adjusted total assets Efficiency of the investment
or increase of credit risk if
loans becomes higher
_/+. High yields may indicate that the
bank is taking risky loans. Low yield
may  indicate  that  that  risk  is  not
priced properly.
R301 - operational margin (difference




R305 - operational margin (monthly
average in the semester)
Spread _
R308 - monthly average yield on
operational assets in the semester
Profitability _ /+ . It depends on the state of the
banking cycle because risky projects
can be very profitable at first.
R401 - interest income earned by term
depositors
Credit risk _
R403 - ratio of administrative cost to
adjusted total assets
Efficiency _/+. It depends on the bank’ s profile
(if retailer or wholesaler)
R405 –  total funding cost Credit risk _
R406 - ratio of salaries and employee
benefits to managerial expenses
Efficiency _
R409 - ratio of administrative cost to
average assets
Efficiency. _
* In developed countries, the sign would usually be positive because it would mean that the bank is
efficient. In emerging countries, high spreads may mean  that the bank is “ gambling for the resurrection”
as Rojas-Suárez (2001) displays: high spreads show that the bank is making risky loans.
36Macroeconomic Covariates
Variables Description Survival Time: Expected Sign
IPCA Consumer Price Index _
IPI Industrial Production Indicator (2002 = 100). _/+.  Negative  if  it  lags  lending
booms.
Selic Selic rate accumulated in the month per year
and deflated by IPCA
_  /+.  Negative  if  it  is  related  to
potential interest rate shock.
Embi Average spread over US Treasury of Brazilian
sovereign bonds calculated by J.P. Morgan
_
Mres Ratio of total imports to international reserves
(liquidity concept)
_ / +
M1res and M2res Ratio of means of payment- M1 (average in
the working days of the month) and M2 (stock




Indicator What the Variables Measure Survival Time: Expected Sign
Crisco ** Ratio of risk 2 loans (level H) to total loans _. Potential bank herding behavior
or deposit runs.
Crgdp Ratio of total loans (in USD) to monthly GDP
(in USD).
_/+  .  If  the  ratio  is  very  high,  it
may  indicate  regulatory
forbearance.
Varcre Percentual change of loan per month _. It may indicate lending booms.
Specific Covariates
Indicator What the Variables Measure Survival Time: Expected Sign
ativoreal (real assets) Total assets deflated by IPCA. +.  Economies of sca le and portfolio
diversification.
Vardvlag3 and Vardvmean Monthly changing of demand deposits. +  .  Higher  demand  deposit  means
more creditworthiness.
** Risk 2 loans are loans with past due more than 60 days and without enough collateral and for all loans
with past due 180 days or more.
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Desciptive statistics and test for equality of mean
Variable Mean Median Standard-error (mean)
d=0 d=1 d=0 d=1 d=0 d=1
r205 29.12 35.81 8.81 6.84 1.044 7.790
a103* 6.45 7.50 3.01 4.50 0.108 0.262
r305*** -114.06 0.98 0.57 0.81 10.785 0.195
c204*** 853.62 1282.46 520.37 551.80 14.006 60.791
a201 13.10 13.27 6.00 5.69 0.199 0.502
e202*** 5.20 35.84 6.18 0.59 9.471 7.754
a203*** 9.00 6.94 3.27 2.16 0.173 0.347
r409*** 0.84 1.24 0.59 0.84 0.008 0.040
c107** 21.44 73.21 7.81 8.68 2.513 19.820
r206*** -0.19 -0.42 0.11 0.03 0.036 0.096
ativorealfim*** 2.10E+08 1.40E+08 5.70E+06 2.20E+06 1.58E+07 1.78E+07
a101 20.86 -6.78 40.14 36.83 5.042 18.816
a102*** 89.17 85.58 93.21 90.45 0.135 0.349
a106*** 5.43 3.24 0.00 0.00 0.162 0.220
a108 10.90 7.34 2.06 0.23 0.174 0.340
a202 3.38 2.67 0.20 0.22 0.114 0.179
a301*** 79.56 85.61 85.32 89.53 0.474 0.750
a302*** 3.88 6.83 0.80 0.86 0.089 0.388
a303 141.23 224.08 77.47 87.49 8.208 29.422
c102*** 62.25 70.51 68.79 76.04 0.283 0.666
c104*** 17.28 9.83 5.32 0.18 0.245 0.416
l104*** 255.55 189.73 120.61 120.74 7.148 12.438
r102 -0.36 -0.35 0.92 0.58 0.295 0.166
r201*** -125.33 -488.24 5.77 1.42 60.971 153.448
r301*** -153.27 -45.30 0.61 0.83 12.456 17.513
r308 7.94 3.78 2.78 2.99 1.496 0.200
r401*** 150.83 4.16 0.00 -0.32 12.242 1.447
r403*** 0.98 1.30 0.60 0.80 0.020 0.046
r405*** 27.94 2.62 -1.06 -1.22 5.089 1.448
r406 6.13 -16.35 51.87 50.86 12.007 40.914
Obs1: d=0 for banks that did not fail and d=1 otherwise.
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40A.2.4 Models B and D
Summary of Results for Models B and D










e2 0.61123 0.32539 0.355
e3 0.88446 0.43497 0.803
e4 0.51569 0.28879 0.237
e5* 0.22861 0.17885 0.059
e6 0.83231 0.41070 0.710
e7 0.81028 0.41939 0.684
e8 1.14667 0.57368 0.784
e9 0.20208 0.20743 0.119
varcre2** 1.02919 0.01159 0.011
mres2*** 2.9E+8 2.0E+09 0.006
Recovery Adm. Expenses** 0.98906 0.00535 0.042 0.99021 0.00452 0.031
Atypical assets/ total assets *** 1.03252 0.00782 0.000 1.03423 0.00766 0.000
Operational Margin*** 1.00045 0.0001 0.000 1.00045 0.00010 0.000
Leverage ratio*** 1.0002 0.00005 0.000 1.0002 0.00005 0.000
Non-performing/ total loans *** 1.03274 0.00531 0.000 1.03368 0.00493 0.000
Evol. typical assets operat. *
1/ 0.99995 0.00005 0.336 0.99996 0.00004 0.324
Loan reserve coverage*** 0.96639 0.00921 0.000 0.96586 0.00869 0.000
Adm. Cost/ average assets 1.11309 0.09027 0.186 1.09195 0.09507 0.312
Other liabilities/ liabilities.*** 1.00032 0.00005 0.000 1.00032 0.00005 0.000
Return on adjusted total assets 0.97571 0.01905 0.208 0.97804 0.01909 0.255
Real assets 1.00000 0.00000 0.182 1.00000 4.4E-10 0.182
    Note: ***, ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
41A.2.5 Model and Distribution Selection
Criteria AIC e BIC to model selection
Model df AIC BIC
A 14 300.46 400.23
B 20 307.55 450.08
C 14 299.20 398.96
D 12 302.27 387.78
Criteria AIC e BIC to distribution selection
Distribution Model A Model C Model D
Criteria AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
Exponential 300.47 400.23 299.20 398.96 302.27 387.78
Weibull 301.62 408.51 297.90 404.79 304.26 396.90
Log-logistic 302.35 409.24 295.76 402.65 304.46 397.10
Lognormal 300.11 407.00 295.13 402.02 304.10 396.74
Gompertz 299.13 406.03 300.68 407.57 303.99 396.63
Gammma Gen. 298.90 412.92 295.73 409.75 302.86 402.63
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